Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

Introduction

Germany’s global technology diplomacy and  Russia’s invasion of Ukraine upended Germany’s change through trade” policy. Which was focused on stability. As a result, the struggle had a profound impact on Germany’s foreign policy concerning technology. Which has substantial geopolitical and ideological implications? China is already vying to become the technology leader.

In order to overtake the US as the world’s most powerful nation by the middle of this century. Digital technology, which was once praised for facilitating public opposition to injustice,. Is it also being use by authoritarian governments to strengthen their hold on power at home?

Germany’s global technology diplomacy—the convergence of technological, geopolitical, and ideological goals—is putting pressure on technical standard-setting. Cyber norms, diplomacy, and internet governance discourses. And the infrastructure supporting global connections.

To buck this trend, Germany’s global technology diplomacy has to intensify its international efforts. And collaborate closely with its friends and partners. The nation has to actively participate in creating a governance environment. That aligns with its goals and ideals as a leader in high technology, a liberal democracy, and an international economy.

Germany’s global technology diplomacy The State of Play

The battle for dominance over Germany’s global technology digital connections is at the core of the fragmentation. That is upending international digital governance. This is the early vision of the internet as decentralized, global, and open. Multi-stakeholder governance infrastructure contrasts with the demands of certain nations: sole sovereign control over the dissemination of information.

The expression of political opinion that Russia and China jointly stated. “Any attempts to limit their sovereign right to regulate national segments of the Internet. And ensure their security” would be unacceptable.  This is a growing use of interventionist content-monitoring policies and internet shutdowns. Like those that happen during anti-government demonstrations in Belarus (summer 2020). Kazakhstan (winter 2021–22), and Iran (fall 2022) are equally concerning.

https://awebtech.co/2024/04/03/the-history-of-technology/ ‎These divergent ideologies result in escalating power struggles within the internet itself. Particularly among organizations in charge of their development and administration.  In response, democratic nations in the Global North, such as Germany in 2010, have reiterated their backing.  This technical internet is a governance center for a group of multi-stakeholder organizations. Such as Internet engineering. These task forces are the Internet Task Force (IETF).

The Internet Society (ISOC), and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). Moreover, others are pushing for bold legislative initiatives, like the EU’s Digital Markets Act, to restrict.  These are the concentration and middlemanship of big digital firms over private and business internet activities. Crucially, democratic governments are constructing a shared political agenda. Through the Elam G7 Resilient Democracies Statement,.

The Paris Call for Stability and Security in Cyberspace, and the Christchurch Call for a Free, Open, and Secure Internet. These initiatives set up democracies against powerful authoritarian nations. That supports national sovereignty and state control, namely China, Russia, and Iran. These nations are working harder on a global scale to reassign governance responsibilities to multi-stakeholder organizations. Germany’s global technology diplomacy and its allies support.

For instance, Chinese business Huawei proposes a “New IP” project to the International Telecommunication. Union (ITU) to update the Internet Protocol (IP) suite. Some believe that this might potentially provide more opportunities for information control in the logical layer of the internet. In addition to duplicating the work of multi-stakeholder groups and undermining compatibility with the current IP architecture,.

Germany’s Global Technology Diplomacy China is concurrently advancing its aim for cyber sovereignty. Through the establishment of new institutions. One recent instance is the establishment of the World Internet Conference, an international organization headquartered in Wuzhen. Diplomacy pertaining to international cyber standards is also mark by these fault lines. Last year’s agreement on Owe Go’s final report was the first.

That’s all the UN member states that participated in a process to establish consensus on cyber standards. Notably, the report contained consensus on wording and suggestions for conscientious state conduct. That came from meetings of the UN Governmental Groups of Experts (GGE). Still, there are disagreements, especially when it comes to Germany’s global technology diplomacy.  The backing of non-governmental players and implementation-focused approaches.  Otherwise, if nothing is done swiftly,.

A French-Egyptian plan for a program of action that seeks to revitalize collaboration through a permanent UN forum. Which—backed by Germany—risks becoming lost in the shadows? There are still differences in the field of cybercrime.

Russia succeeded in getting a UN General Assembly resolution approved. The formulation of a new cybercrime convention was approved in December 2019, following ten years of unsuccessful attempts.  Constitutional negotiations start this year and will go through the 78th General Assembly meeting in 2023.

However, the resolution strikes against Germany’s global technology diplomacy objective of fortifying the current Budapest agreement. And there are worries that a new agreement may erode fundamental liberties in the name of combating cybercrime.  The July 2022, 14th Beijing BRICS assertion, restates. These members’ support for the Ad Hoc Committee on a new cybercrime agreement was another blow.

The debate over cyber standards and internet governance also highlights a concerning worldwide trend among the G77+. Many of them are democratic nations that see themselves. Positioned between multi-stakeholder and intergovernmental approaches to internet governance. The +5 nations (South Africa, Senegal, India, and Indonesia). And Argentina is invited to Germany’s Elmau summit to endorse the G7 Democratic Resilience Statement.

The Paris Call and the Declaration for the Future of the Internet (DFI), which were sign by Germany’s Technology.  And the EU includes more than 60 other nations in an attempt to articulate a positive and human rights-centered vision. The internet has, however, proven to be a reluctance point in the context of a global digital order.

Attempts to establish technological-infrastructural zones of influence are another manifestation. These growing ideologies are fragmented, especially in the Global South. The digital aspect of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) aims to promote technologies for smart cities and ports. Predictive policing and health data are analytics.

As well as, to connect dozens of countries through Chinese fiber optic cables, data centers, and satellite navigation systems.  The digital Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) spans the European Union’s. This is an immediate neighborhood encompassing the Balkans and North Africa, as well as Germany. The BRI’s European terminus is believed to be Duisburg.

Germany’s global technology diplomacy in response to the Belt and Road Initiative. The Group of Seven (G7), led by Germany,. pledged to pool $600 billion in public. Private investment through its Partnership for Global Infrastructure Investment (PGII) over the next five years.

However, concerns persist over the means of raising these funds and, more importantly,. The degree to which the PIG’s information and communications technology (ICT). Components will be ambitious and competitive with the BRI’s digital component. Which has already disbursed an estimated $79 billion in investments,.

Furthermore, it is unclear how the PGII ties into the EU’s €300 billion Global Gateway program. Which was introduced in late 2021. Combining several national, EU, and G7 efforts into a competitive and cohesive strategic response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. (BRI) remains a major issue for Germany and like-minded nations, especially in light of the difficult geopolitical environment.

A concomitant aspect of infrastructure geopolitics is the diminishing capacity of Germany. Its European allies influence worldwide technological norms. Particularly, China had great success placing technical professionals in important standard-setting bodies (SBs)—China’s proportion of Working Group secretariats.

The Technical Committee and Subcommittee Secretariats of the International Standards Organization (ISO). Correspondingly, it quadrupled and almost doubled between 2011 and 2018. 2020 saw more new ISO technical leadership positions fill by Chinese delegates than by German ones for the first time.  China holds a unique distinction in that regard.  It is the only nation to be represented in every Joint Technical Committee (JTC) subcommittee.

JTC 1 is instrumental in the development of ICT standards under the auspices of the ISO/International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). Encompassing the cloud are computing, the Internet of Things, and artificial intelligence.  The top leadership positions at the ISO, ITU, and IEC have also recently been hold. By, or are now held by, Chinese people.

The gradual transition of Germany and Europe from standard-setters to standard-adopters poses a danger. Of causing significant adjustment costs for the industry.  ¬In the ISO and IEC, Germany continues to have more secretariats than the US, China, and other significant nations.  However, Beijing’s intentional expansion of influence in areas like artificial intelligence. 5G networking has been made possible by China’s state-centric stand framework.

This is a political issue as well Standards may become national security dangers. When they (intentionally) incorporate cyber vulnerabilities that are unwittingly accepted globally. Standards can entrench principles such as privacy protection (or lack thereof).

However, a new institutional architecture for the governance of emergent technologies is beginning to emerge among this dispersion, given the G7 initiative. Germany’s Global Technology Partnership on AI (GPAI), the AI Council of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. The Ad Hoc Committee on AI (CAHAI) of the Council of Europe and the AI principles of major technology corporations.  AI is a prime example of this quantum technology, as are cryptos, a distributed ledger-based internet (Web3), and smart and green technologies.

And with other technologies, similar governance ecosystems are anticipate to emerge and establish norms and standards. This will provide Germany, the EU, and their allies access to vital diplomatic terrain.

Germany’s global technology diplomacy and The Current Policy Approach

Germany’s approach to foreign technology policy is significantly influence by its commitment to multilateralism and a rules-based system. The Ample government has emphasized global, open, and secure digital connections.  And enhancing multilateralism as the main focus of its foreign policy.

Germany’s global technology diplomacy is pushing for the creation of a normative cyberspace order. It participates in the UN OEWG on ICT in the context of international security. The Council of Europe’s, work on artificial intelligence (CAHAI) and data protection (Convention 108+). And it is a supporter of the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace.

Simultaneously, Germany finds it difficult to use its involvement in more intimate and smaller organizations. To work with like-minded governments to build a forward-looking technological agenda. Germany’s 2017 G20 presidency showcased the nation’s capacity to establish technology as a central concern. As shown by the organization of the G20’s inaugural gathering of digital ministers.

Nonetheless, the government continues to see digital concerns largely through a business lens. Berlin has increased its rhetoric on issues like digital authoritarianism and internet fragmentation during its current G7 chairmanship. In essence, though, Germany declines to prioritize digital challenges on its national agenda.

Germany’s global technology diplomacy is aggressively collaborating with the Global South on digital concerns, though by utilizing its vast diplomatic network and development infrastructure. It has lately brought back frequent digital communication to organize cooperative research and development initiatives, talk about cyber challenges.

And coordinate work in multilateral forums with important nations, including Brazil, Japan, and India. Berlin is now discussing digital talks with South Korea, Indonesia, and Argentina. Since then, the bilateral format has proven to be beneficial. Africa’s strategic relevance in the digital sector has also been acknowledge by Germany’s global technology diplomacy.

Through its “Digital Africa” program, it has directed €164 million into digital initiatives. And start over 200 public-private partnerships in the African technology industry since 2015. With multi stakeholder engagement from the commercial sector, civil society, and subnational governments in the African Union, Kenya, and South Africa. And Ghana’s digital and foreign ministries are sketching institutionalized digital conversations. There are plans to increase digital collaboration with Egypt.

Germany’s global technology diplomacy, however, has higher stakes in terms of strategy. Achieving synergies with EU initiatives will become more crucial to Germany’s ability to influence global digital governance. In actuality, Germany’s technological diplomacy is part of a broader shift in EU technology policy. It is toward a clearly geo-strategic perspective. Brussels highlights the connection between digital sovereignty and European values more than the German policy discourse.  The bloc’s Digital Compass for 2030 confirms that technology plays a role in “global influence.”

The EU has started converting this connection into a foreign strategy that works. This includes structures like the EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC). The Global Gateway initiative, the new TTC with India, and the EU’s 5G cyber security toolbox. Which, at its Paris meeting, introduced new ICT security guidelines for reliable vendors in development initiatives.

Particularly in light of Russia’s actions against Ukraine, the EU-US TTC is becoming a platform for democratic collaboration on matters ranging from export controls to. The  investment screening process has to have robust semiconductor supply chains. In an effort to improve transatlantic cooperation on digital concerns, the EU is now setting up shop in Silicon Valley.

Recommendations

Germany will succeed or fail in enshrouding its values and interests in a network of alliances, partnerships, and norms. That will allow it to be a leading high-tech industrial economy.  Lean toward democracy in shaping the global technological order. Consequently, German ought to:

Promote the idea of a democratic trust area for technology.  In order to increase competitiveness and trustworthiness for strategically significant ICT infrastructure, such as network equipment, cloud/edge service providers, and smart city technologies, this trust zone would restrict movements of talents, cash, and data.

It needs to be based on best practices for regulations and a technology-industrial policy strategy that strategically uses interdependencies to secure collaboration and protect access to vital technologies and resources. In order to do this, the government ought to back a robust institutional core that includes enhanced EU-US TTC meetings, an expansive OECD digital agenda, and an ambitious G7 digital ministerial meeting.

Create a global connectivity paradigm that considers unrestricted access to the greatest network in the world as a fundamental human right. Furthermore, Germany has been working with other like-minded democracies and EU members to jointly finance “connectivity packages” that include support for the expansion of cyberspace capacity and telecommunications infrastructure, in addition to the continued aid of regional digital privacy groups.

International cooperation across borders is also essential, though.-In order to close the digital divide globally, advance the UN Sustainable Development Goals on connectivity (9c), and maintain the free flow of information during times of conflict and authoritarian-driven Internet outages, Germany should put pressure on the EU, NATO, and other like-minded nations to provide capabilities (like satellites).

Form an Open Tech Foundation in Germany. Digital sovereignty in the Global South is explicitly mention by the Ample alliance as a top priority for providing an individual, not state-centric, idea of digital self-determination, preventing lock-in effects, and maintaining freedom of choice over vendors, platforms, and ICT infrastructure.

Open source and open technology may now be financially supported, primarily in Germany, thanks to the recently founded Sovereign Tech Fund. In accordance with the coalition’s global view of digital sovereignty, it should be supplement by a German Open Tech Foundation to give worldwide support, especially among communities in the Global South, for the creation of technologies that uphold democracy and enhance privacy.

Standard-setting for new and important technologies should be depoliticized. Germany’s global technology should form an international research group to determine if and what political tools may be used to capture standard-setting for developing and essential technologies, as the share of non-market economies in SSBs increases.

This needs to serve as the cornerstone for coordinated interactions with SSBs to uphold their reputation for objectivity and guarantee the importance of technical criteria. The German government could also support high-caliber draft introductions, for instance, by permitting the academic and small- and medium-sized business (SME) sectors to collaborate on emerging technology standards projects that qualify for funding for research and development.

Take steps to prevent the formation of an online “Non-Aligned Movement.” An order based on democratic technology has to extend beyond the transatlantic region. It’s concerning that the G77+ states are avoiding a strong endorsement of a shared democratic technology agenda as technology becomes more and more geopolitical.

In this context, India is an important but complicated partner. Germany included India on this year’s G7 guest list and has already reopened its digital communication with the nation in 2022. Germany can now build on this to highlight India’s democratic responsibilities to promote an inclusive digital agenda focused on climate-friendly technologies as well as open and free connections, especially because India will be the G20 president in 2023.

Participate cooperatively in US-EU technology discussions, particularly in the TTC. Germany and the US should establish a bilateral digital conversation that will help to harmonize and enhance TTC policy deliverables. However, Germany’s global technology ought to be more involved abroad as well, especially in reaching a positive agreement on and carrying out the post-Privacy Shield Transatlantic Data Privacy Framework.

Considered a precursor to the July 2021 Washington Declaration, Germany’s global technology diplomacy American Futures Forum will hold.  Its first conference is in November 2022, and it offers an additional avenue for deeper collaboration. Particularly with regard to norms and technology that support democracy.

Form asymmetric technological alliances with governments at the subnational level. States and cities are taking on more and more of the duties associated with digital governance.  That federal governments are either unable or unwilling to handle. States and localities in the US have taken the lead in data privacy, thanks in part to regulations imposed on AI-powered face recognition software and algorithmic bias in delicate domains like employment.

Germany’s global technology diplomacy: Subnational governments are in charge of technology-industrial and regulatory policies in China, Brazil, and India. Germany should collaborate with subnational governments to create technological alliances that represent EU and German regulatory ideals and encourage subnational adoption of internet and cyber governance standards, in accordance with the latest findings of the European Council on digital diplomacy.

About the Project

An integrated policy approach to German digital capacities and aims is propose by this DGAP initiative. Such a plan ought to connect Germany’s geopolitical goals with its current industrial capabilities and digital governance goals.

The integrated strategy outline in this paper, the sixth in the series, is built around seven interconnections. (Levels of a technology policy stack.) In order to conduct this study, the DGAP asked thirty people to join a working group. And take part in seven private seminars on critical strategic.  Facts about Germany’s global technology diplomacy and digital identity between July and October, 2021.

Participants include prominent academics, economists, and political theorists; representatives of civil society and digital rights advocacy organizations; elected officials, candidates, and senior German government representatives; German political party staff in charge of platforms and coalition agreements; subject matter experts in technology and foreign policy; thought leaders; and senior technology-company management

Additional specialists were invited to attend the sessions if required. Each session focused on a distinct level of Germany’s global technology diplomacy policy framework. Throughout the writing of the current installment, discussion collaborators were contacted on occasion.

We would like to thank the Open Society effort for Europe for their helpful assistance in bringing this effort to fruition.